41% of Airline's Pilots Fail Safety Tests

[fountainhall]

Soon after the Taiwan Transasia ATR crash after take-off from Taipei's domestic airport last week, it was reported that the pilots suffered a flame-out in one engine. They then switched off the wrong engine. By the time they realised their error, it was too late. The flight was doomed. Taiwan's Civil Aviation Authority then ordered all Transasia's ATR pilots to undergo immediate retraining, an action which resulted in the cancellation of 90 flights.

Shocking news today that 29 Transasia pilots have been suspended for either failing or missing the retraining testing. That's 29 out of 71. So 41% of that airlines pilots may not have had all the required skills to fly the ATR aircraft which crashed.

It surely points out one absolute of flying as a passenger. It doesnt matter how fancy or luxurious the passenger experience becomes or how cheap the tickets are or how modern the fleet, the airline you fly must have the best training programmes and facilities, the best safety-based culture, the best engineers and experienced pilots highly trained in all the skills required to handle all emergencies - barring a total hull explosion (as happened to the Malaysian aircraft over the Ukraine).

http://www.bbc.com/n...d-asia-31404500

Contrast this with the crew of a Cathay Pacific flight A330 from Surabaya to Hong Kong in 2010. On descent into Hong Kong, the pilots noticed a System Fault Warning in one engine and a Stall Warning in the other. With the aircraft still 83 kms away from the airport, the Stall Warning also appeared on the second engine. One engine was all but idling and the other had to be put on maximum speed to compensate. The pilots issued a Mayday warning, then the real emergency Pan Pan warning before using all their experience in getting that aircraft on to the ground safely. They achieved that at a ground speed of 426 kph - 176 kph faster than the A330s normal touch down speed, above the normal flap extension speed and higher than the speed rating of the tyres. Only one thrust reverser deployed and five tyres burst. 57 passengers were injured in the evacuation.None was killed.

The cause of the problem? Contaminated fuel at Surabaya. In March last year, the two pilots were awarded the Polaris Award by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations, for their heroism and airmanship.

[Surfcrest]

[youtube:3palxd7y]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qa3RnQ-4vEQ[/youtube:3palxd7y]

http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/asia/transasia-crash-pilot-tests/

Surfcrest

[Nirish guy]

it was reported that the pilots suffered a flame-out in one engine. They then switched off the wrong engine. By the time they realised their error, it was too late.

Surely in this age of computer controls and warnings etc its possible to rig SOME form of total override to stop a pilot doing that in error, i.e. a simple code that would say to the computer "No matter what never kill the good / only engine in an emergency situation" as surely there can NEVER be a reason why what might need to be done ? It brings back memories of the British Midland Kegworth air disaster in 1989 where it was EXACTLY the same situation and response from the pilots that caused that plane to crash with the loss of 47 lives so surely after all these years they could work out SOME way of stopping that simply error taking place or building in an override should a pilot make that same mistake today ?

[Surfcrest]

A very good point and fortunately, no matter where in the world they happen airline mishaps are usually thoroughly investigated. If this is indeed one of the contributing factors to the crash it will be listed in the report making the airlines and the aircraft manufacturers liable, should they not comply with recommendations and make the necessary upgrade to the equipment or changes to pilot checklists.

Surfcrest

[fountainhall]

fortunately, no matter where in the world they happen airline mishaps are usually thoroughly investigated. If this is indeed one of the contributing factors to the crash it will be listed in the report making the airlines and the aircraft manufacturers liable, should they not comply with recommendations and make the necessary upgrade to the equipment or changes to pilot checklists.
Well, that's the theory. Fact is, though, this has happened before. As Nirish points out, in 1989 that British Midland 737 crashed after a serious engine fire had forced the captain to shut down the engine and divert to the alternate airport. But as the accident report discovered - he shut down the wrong engine.

In this case, the Air Accidents Bureau came to several conclusions, including -


тАЬThe following factors contributed to the incorrect response of the flight crew: 1. The combination of heavy engine vibration, noise, shuddering and an associated smell of fire were outside their training and experience; 2. They reacted to the initial engine problem prematurely and in a way that was contrary to their training; 3. They did not assimilate the indications on the engine instrument display before they throttled back the No. 2 engine . . .тАЭ

In other words, had the pilots simply looked at their instruments, it would have been clear where the problem lay. That 1989 crash and the recent one in Taipei should never have happened (unless there was also a fault in the instrument panel of the ATR aircraft. Time will tell).

Accident reports are all very well. But If airlines are not prepared to put into action the results, then as in the case of the TransAsia crash many future passengers will always be at the mercy of inefficient and badly managed airlines.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec ... 19890108-0 (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890108-0)

As several pilots have been commenting on the Professional Pilots Rumour Network (pprune.org), the Taiwan captain was also very much at fault for shutting down the engine so close to the ground. There was absolutely no reason to do so at that height. As one Australian pilot says:


"Manipulating power levers and fuel shutoffs just after takeoff when one propeller has auto feathered and the aircraft is still completely climb-able and controllable is just nuts. That's why these damn things have auto feather in the first place. If it's climbing, sit on your hands and keep it flying. Anything and everything else can wait."

[Surfcrest]

It sounds, from the Cineflix (Mayday) enactment of the 1989 crash that some key recommendations did come from that investigation including a better understanding of the injuries suffered in this crash and better universal "brace" positions for passengers in the event of a mishap.

[youtube:tgdygizr]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ei82DfiygeI[/youtube:tgdygizr]

Unfortunately, from that investigation it sounds as though the pilot and co-pilot were somewhat held responsible fro their role in shutting down the wrong engine. What apparently was not addressed were the contributing factors that lead two experienced pilots to make this error (auto throttle disengagement, the positioning of the instruments and the turbulence caused by the engine failure and what impact that had on the pilot's ability to quickly identify the left engine problem) in the first place.

Hopefully an investigation will provide the recommendations to make split second errors like these less possible.

Surfcrest

[fountainhall]

It sounds, from the Cineflix (Mayday) enactment of the 1989 crash that some key recommendations did come from that investigation including a better understanding of the injuries suffered in this crash and better universal "brace" positions for passengers in the event of a mishap.
The Report also mandated increased engine inspections and improvements to engine vibration indicators on 737s.

However, no change to the flight deck instruments regarding the engines seems to have been included. Inevitably, in a crash like the 1989 one at Kegworth, it's rarely one event that will bring down a plane. It's far more usual, as in this case, to be a combination of mechanical and human error. And the human element has to be considered in the light of what may often be near panic in the cockpit.

In the Kegworth incident, the captain made a dreadful mistake based on his perceived knowledge rather than reading the instruments. One report states this. The captain "thought that the smoke was coming forward from the passenger cabin which, from his understanding of the 737's air conditioning system, led him to believe that the smoke was in fact coming from the No 2 (right) engine. Consequently the command was issued to throttle back the No.2 engine . . . As soon as the No.2 engine had been shut down, all evidence of smoke cleared from the flight deck which further convinced the Commander that he had made the correct decision, not least in that No.1 engine showed no signs of malfunctioning and continued to operate albeit at reduced power and with increased fuel flow."

http://EzineArticles.com/1024617

Given that incidents in the cockpit will always happen from time to time, surely training then becomes the key to a successful outcome (as in the case of the CX A330 flight I highlighted earlier). A pilot responsible for 500 lives in the air (and goodness knows how many possibly on the ground if their planes crashes) and planes worth up to US$500 million cannot "think" smoke is coming from a particular direction nor "believe" that it must therefore be originating from the No. 2 engine. He absolutely has to check all the dials, bells and whistles and then take decisions based on the facts as presented to him.

The same is true of the several pilots in the Air France Atlantic crash in 2009. The aircraft's systems were screaming stall warnings at the two co-pilots in charge of the aircraft since the captain had retired for some sleep shortly after take-off. Every pilot knows that means nose down to pick up speed before getting the aircraft back on course. These two did not "believe" that what they were hearing was correct and pitched the nose higher.

In that case, according to an extensive Vanity Fair article, one cause of the accident was because the captain had been up all the previous night with his mistress getting just one hour's sleep. He eventually got back to the cockpit with the aircraft at just 4,000 ft and plummeting fast towards the sea. Had he been in charge when the pitot tubes froze up and started giving incorrect speed readings, it is suggested the crash would not have happened. As the Vanity Fair article neatly sums it up -


A small glitch took Flight 447 down, a brief loss of airspeed indicationsтАФthe merest blip of an information problem during steady straight-and-level flight. It seems absurd, but the pilots were overwhelmed.
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business ... -447-crash (http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash)